The Large Hadron Collider (LHC), presently under construction at CERN, will require a helium cryogenic system unprecedented in size and capacity, with more than 1600 superconducting magnets operating in superfluid helium and a total inventory of almost 100 tonnes of helium. The objective of the Preliminary Risk Analysis (PRA) is to identify all risks to personnel, equipment or environment resulting from failures that may accidentally occur within the cryogenic system of LHC in any phase of the machine operation, and that could not be eliminated by design. Assigning a gravity coefficient and one analyzing physical processes that will follow any of the recognised failure modes allows to single out worst case scenarios. Recommendations concerning lines of preventive and corrective defence, as well as for further detailed studies, are formulated. 
INTRODUCTION
The safety philosophy of the LHC cryogenic system 1 rests on specific design features that differ from the options chosen for the cryogenic systems of other large superconducting accelerators, 2 and contribute to make the LHC cryogenic system inherently safe, with a limited number of possible risks and failures. These features are:
• the presence of a high-capacity, cold recovery header D (see Figures 1 and 2 ) which has a nominal working pressure of 1.3 bar (design pressure of 20 bar), a nominal working temperature of 20 K and a volume of about 60 m 3 per 3.3 km sector of the collider. Helium expelled from the magnet cold mass after a loss of insulation vacuum or magnet resistive transitions will discharge into header D. The header will also accommodate helium relieved from other cryogenic distribution line (QRL) headers after degradation of insulation vacuum. The only header protected with safety valves venting directly to underground areas is header B because of its low design pressure.
• the absence of nitrogen (liquid or gaseous) in the tunnel, in any operating mode; liquid nitrogen is only used for helium pre-cooling at ground surface during cool-down.
• the absence of forced helium flow by mechanical devices (pumps) in cooling loops, resulting in limited discharge of fluid in case of header rupture.
The cryogenic flow-scheme considered in the PRA is that described in reference 3 . The LHC operation modes have been defined on the basis of a tentative yearly operation schedule 4 : machine warm, drifting, 75 K stand-by, cool-down, 1.9 K stand-by, system test or ramp down, normal operation, warm up. Additionally, operation modes that will not happen on a regular basis have also been considered: short intervention on a cold sector and limited quench of a maximum of 8 cells of the LHC machine.
ELEMENTS OF PRELIMINARY RISK ANALYSIS
The cryogenic system of LHC is treated as being composed of separate helium enclosures, called nodes in the following. Each node is characterised by the amount and thermodynamic parameters of the helium enclosed. For the enclosures that are vacuum insulated, the volume of the vacuum space is also relevant. This conceptual scheme based on nodes is shown in Figure 3 . TCV943  QV920  TCV920  TCV947  TCV910  TCV915   HX910   TCV943  TCV947  TCV915  TCV910 HX910 A cryogenic-related failure mode is defined as an accidental event (see Table 1 ) that may involve mass transfer of helium or air between helium enclosure, insulation or beam vacuum space and environment, a result of any constructional element break or malfunction (eg. broken bellows or leaking valve). A cryogenic failure mode may also be an unexpected energy release to helium in the magnet cold mass as a result of an extended resistive transition or an electrical arc. It is then possible to split a complex cryogenic system into a moderate number of nodes and perform a PRA even in the early stage of the system design. From their consequences, the LHC cryogenic related failures have been classified into three groups of increasing gravity, numbered from 1 to 3:
• Gravity 1: failure does not involve helium relief from the machine, • Gravity 2: helium is blown out of the machine directly to the environment at ground surface, • Gravity 3: helium is blown out of the machine to the confined area (e.g. tunnel).
For each cryogenic related failure mode, an attempt to assign a probability of mishap has been made and with following descriptive scale of probability used 5 : • A (Frequent): failure likely to occur repeatedly during the life-cycle of the system.
• B (Occasional): failure likely to occur several times in the life-cycle of the system.
• C (Occasional): failure likely to occur sometimes in the life-cycle of the system • D (Remote): failure not likely to occur in the life-cycle, but nevertheless possible.
• E (Improbable): probability of failure occurrence cannot be distinguished from zero.
The Preliminary Risk Analysis of the LHC cryogenic system has been performed in three steps:
• The first step (Identification) has consisted of listing all the machine nodes, cryogenics related failures and operation modes. Data have been collected through dedicated hearings, discussions and experience gathered at CERN.
•
The objective of the second step (Combination) has been to list all potential failures for every node in any mode of the collider operation.
• The third step (Analysis) has been conducted in two parts. First, for each potential failure a YES/NO decision has been made, with the aim of retaining credible failures only. Then a descriptive analysis of the causes and consequences of each credible failure has been made and to each event a gravity level, as defined above, has been assigned. For the failures of gravity 2 and 3, the associated risks have been described and recommendations formulated. Finally worst case scenarios for the nodes located in the tunnel, caverns, shafts and surface have been identified and a descriptive probability for each of the mishaps estimated.
The technique used for performing the PRA of the LHC cryogenic system is based on FEMECA (Failure Mode and Effect Criticality Analysis) 6 . It fulfils the general requirements of the Preliminary Risk Analysis of a complex technical system, and in particular of a superconducting cryogenic system 7, 8 . 
RESULTS OF THE PRELIMINARY RISK ANALYSIS
The PRA of the cryogenic system for the whole LHC machine was performed 9 , however this paper focuses on the detailed analysis concerning the nodes located in the tunnel; for the whole machine, we give only summary results.
A typical cross-section of the LHC tunnel is shown in Figure 4 . The accelerator will be composed of the LHC cryomagnets paralleled by the cryogenic distribution line. Both will be linked by jumper connections every 107 m. The nodes of LHC cryogenic system located in the tunnel, together with the amount of helium enclosed and vacuum insulation volume are listed in Table 2 and schematically represented in Figure 5 .
All potential failures at the cryogenic nodes located in the tunnel have been identified, which may happen in any phase of the collider operation. In this way, over five hundred (namely 540) of the failures have been defined. Subsequently, for each potential failure a YES/NO decision has been made to eliminate events that are not credible and 183 credible failures have been retained. Finally, some of the credible failures have been qualified as worst case scenarios on the criterion of mass of helium discharged and access to the tunnel. Twelve events of gravity level 3 have been identified. Table 3 lists these events, gives the amounts of helium that might be relieved to the tunnel together with approximate peak mass flow rates. Residence time (1) [s] As it follows from Table 3 , two worst case scenarios can be identified based on the criterion of mass of helium involved and peak flow rate to the tunnel: helium flow to QRL insulation vacuum (assumption of a full break of header C) and a break of a jumper connection.
More generally, table 4 summarises the PRA of the LHC cryogenic system giving worst case scenarios following the failures of the modes located in the tunnel, caverns, shaft and surface buildings. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
• Due to its specific design features (cold recovery header, absence of nitrogen in the tunnel, no pump driven forced flow in cooling loops) the LHC cryogenic system is inherently safe with a limited number of possible risks and failures, especially those resulting in helium relief to a confined space.
• Out of almost 1000 analysed failure modes there are only 29 events that may be followed by helium discharge to a confined space.
• Worst-case failure modes have been identified and potential amount of helium that might be vented into the machine tunnel, caverns, shafts and surface building as well as peak discharge flow rate have been estimated. More detailed studies are being conducted to assess the development over time of such events and the resulting propagation and diffusion of helium in confined spaces (tunnel, caverns, shafts buildings).
